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TAMING THE LOCUSTS?'
EMBATTLED HEDGE FUNDS IN THE E.U.
ALEXANDROS SERETAKIS*
The recent financial crisis and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis have
put the spotlight on the traditionally secretive and opaque hedge fund indus-
try. Widespread financial losses have provoked popular suspicion against
hedge funds, which are viewed as speculators that destabilize the financial
system. Adhering to the pattern of crisis-driven financial regulation, the Eu-
ropean Union has enacted legislation that is expected to radically transform
the hedge fund industry in Europe. While it may seem at first glance that
only the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and its complex
and burdensome requirements for hedge funds and their managers is ex-
pected to directly impact the hedge fund industry, the effect of the Short Sell-
ing Regulation and the Proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax will be
equally devastating for hedge funds by curtailing their investment tech-
niques and market operations. This article argues that the European Union
has engaged in a crisis-driven regulatory spree and that this regulatory over-
haul is founded on perceptions and popular beliefs rather than actual evi-
dence. In regulating hedge funds, the E. U. has moved forward with regulat-
ing not only hedge funds and their managers, but also their investment
techniques and market operations. The cumulative impact of the E. U. 's reg-
ulatory spree is expected to be a sharp increase in costs for hedge funds oper-
ating in Europe and a decline in investor returns with negative conse-
quences for European investors and markets. Thus the term "embattled"
hedge funds.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Praised as the prototypical arbitrageurs correcting ineffi-
ciencies and providing liquidity in financial markets but criti-
cized for driving short-term profit seeking, creating asset bub-
bles2 and preying on companies like "swarms of locusts, "3
hedge funds remain the most controversial vehicles in the al-
ternative investment funds universe. Twenty-one years after
hedge funds gained mainstream attention when George Soros
speculated against the British pound and won his bet that the
U.K. would be forced to exit the Exchange Rate Mechanism
2. See Photis Lyssandrou, The Real Role of Hedge Funds in the Crisis, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 1, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e
83f9c52-6910-1lel-9931-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2g8gHQO35; Martin Lip-
ton, Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (MARCH 9, 2013, 10:10 AM), available at http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-ac
tivist-hedge-funds/.
3. The description of hedge funds as "swarms of locusts" belongs to the
former Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany Frank
Muntefering following the outcry provoked by the shareholders' rebellion
against Deutsche Boerse's bid for the London Stock Exchange (LSE) which
resulted in the collapse of the bid and the resignation of Deutsche Boerse's
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors. The revolt
was led by U.K-based hedge fund The Children's Investment Fund (TCI)
and marked the advent of Anglo-Saxon aggressive shareholder activism in
the traditionally closed and insider-dominated German corporate system.
For an excellent overview of this landmark revolt and its effects on German
corporate governance, see generally Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst,
Corporate Governance Convergence in Germany through Shareholder Activism: Im-
pact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange, 16J. MGMT. & Gov. 235
(2012).
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and devalue its currency, 4 the hedge fund industry has man-
aged to establish itself as a powerful force in modern financial
markets.
The 2008 financial crisis put financial regulation at the
top of regulators' and politicians' agendas worldwide. Hedge
funds - criticized for operating largely outside regulatory
reach 5 and engaging in highly specialized and controversial in-
vestment techniques such as short-selling, credit default swaps
("CDS") 6 and high frequency trading - were one of the first
targets of regulators and politicians in their efforts to create a
4. After massive selling of the pound with Soros's Quantum Fund at the
forefront, the Bank of England abandoned its defense of the currency and
the British government announced on the evening of the 16th of September
1992, a day which will remain in British history as "Black Wednesday," that it
was withdrawing from the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Apart from earning
himself the nickname "The Man Who Broke the Bank of England," Soros
also made a profit of almost I billion dollars on his speculative bet. See David
Litterick, Billionaire Who Broke the Bank of England, THE TEI.EGRAPH (UK)
(Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2773265/
Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-of-England.html.
5. In contrast to the perceived wisdom frequently expressed by politi-
cians and the press that the hedge fund industry was completely unregu-
lated, at least until the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
(hereinafter "Dodd-Frank Act") and the Alternative Investment Fund Man-
agers Directive (hereinafter "AIFM Directive"), one should note that hedge
funds were in fact regulated by various Member States in the E.U. For in-
stance in the U.K., hedge fund managers were subject to registration with
the Financial Services Authority. Regarding hedge fund regulation in the
European Union prior to the adoption of the AIFM Directive, see generally
PHOF Bus ATHANASSIOU, HEDGE FUND REGUlATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 125-64 (JosephJ. Norton et al. eds.,
2009) (discussing hedge fund regulation in the European Union prior to
the adoption of the AIFM Directive). Even in the U.S. where hedge funds
were not subject to registration with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (hereinafter "SEC") and therefore had no obligation to disclose infor-
mation to the SEC and the public, they were subject to the SEC's investiga-
tion and prosecution authority for insider dealing and fraud. See Luther R.
Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary to Accomplish the Goals
of the Dodd-Frank Act's Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651, 654 (2013).
6. Credit default swaps are a form of insurance against an issuer's de-
fault. The protection seller will compensate the protection buyer in the
event of a loan or bond default or any other "credit event." In return, the
protection buyer will pay a premium to the protection seller. See generally
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019 (2007) (describing the benefits and perils of credit
default swaps).
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new financial architecture.7 The financial crisis presented a
unique opportunity for the European Union and its largest
Member States to bring the industry and its investment tech-
niques under their regulatory grip. Germany and France were
traditionally skeptical towards the hedge fund industry.8 The
sovereign debt crisis and the belief that hedge funds, through
short-selling and CDS trading, aggravated or even caused the
crisis, only reinforced the determination of E.U. regulators to
move forward with their ambitious plans.9 The result was the
adoption of legislation that will radically transform the hedge
fund industry in the E.U. Apart from the passage of Directive
2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
("AIFM Directive"),' 0 which were the first efforts to directly
regulate hedge funds, the European Union has also extended
its regulatory reach to hedge funds' investment techniques
and market operations with the adoption of Regulation 236/
2012, which regulates short-selling and certain aspects of sov-
7. Gordon Brown's Call for a New Bretton Woods Gains Traction, THE TELE-
GRAPH (UK), Oct. 15, 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance
/3201885/Gordon-Browns-call-for-a-new-Bretton-Woods-gains-traction.html.
8. The former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy was one of the most
vocal opponents of freewheeling Anglo-Saxon capitalism and an ardent sup-
porter along with German Chancellor Angela Merkel of stricter pan-Euro-
pean hedge fund regulation. See Patience Wheatcroft, City Should Not Rise to
Sarkozy Rhetoic, WALL ST.J., Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704107104574571933458067204.html; UK. Suf-
fers Hedge Fund Blow, FIN. TIMIs (May 13, 2010), available at http://www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/0/f583a770-5ed4-1 1df-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzz2G54z
Lj7t.
9. See Stephen Fidler, Merkel and Sarkozy's Bid for Haste Risks Derivatives
Strife, WALL ST.J. (June 11, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703627704575298690940763432.html; Patrick Donahue,
Merkel Slams Euro Speculation "Warns of Resentment", BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23,
2010), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aQ9wHnlOENSc; Out of Control: The Destructive Power of the Financial
Markets, DER SPIEGEL (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/business/out-ofcontrol-the-destructive-power-of-the-financial-
markets-a-781590.html.
10. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 8June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/
2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 [hereinafter AIFM Direc-
tive].
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ereign CDS ("Short Selling Regulation")II and the proposal
for a Financial Transaction Tax ("Proposal for a Financial
Transaction Tax").12
This article offers a critique of the recent efforts to regu-
late the hedge fund industry and argues that the European
Union has engaged in a crisis-driven regulatory spree, which
will severely impact the industry and cause hedge funds to
withdraw from European markets. E.U. regulators and politi-
cians have moved towards regulating not only hedge funds
and their managers, but also their key investment techniques
and market operations. The cumulative impact of E.U. legisla-
tion will lead to the diminution of the hedge fund industry in
Europe by squeezing its profits and curtailing the competitive
advantage of hedge funds, namely their ability to operate un-
restrictedly in financial markets and engage in dynamic trad-
ing strategies by quickly entering or exiting positions in differ-
ent markets.
Part I describes hedge funds and their investment tech-
niques. Part II examines the main rationales for hedge fund
regulation and investigates the role of hedge funds in the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007 and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis.
Part III critically assesses recent E.U. legislative attempts to reg-
ulate hedge funds, their investment techniques, and market
operations. The AIFM Directive, the Short Selling Regulation,
and the Proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax, if imple-
mented, would radically transform the hedge fund industry in
Europe. Part IV argues that the European Union's regulatory
response conforms to all the attributes of crisis-driven financial
regulation and paints a rather bleak picture for the future of
the hedge fund industry in Europe, which is embattled with
regulations touching upon not only hedge fund managers and
funds, but also their market operations and investment tech-
niques. Part V concludes by arguing that the cumulative im-
pact of the E.U.'s crisis-driven regulatory spree will be a severe
increase in costs for hedge funds operating in Europe and a
11. Regulation No. 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit de-
fault swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1 [hereinafter Short Selling Regulation].
12. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooper-
ation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, (COM) (2013) 71 final (Feb. 2,
2013).
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decline in investor returns with negative consequences for Eu-
ropean investors and markets.
II.
HEDGE FUNDs: AN INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds, the poster boys of modern financial capital-
ism, owe their existence to Alfred WinslowJones, a former stu-
dent of the Marxist Workers School in Berlin turned invest-
ment manager.' 3 By buying undervalued stocks and selling
overvalued stocks using his superior stock picking abilities and
utilizing leverage to amplify his returns, Jones was able to run
his hedge fund profitably in all market conditions. In addition,
Jones devised the modern hedge fund structure by charging
his investors a performance-based fee and structuring his fund
so that he could escape regulation under U.S. securities laws.
Although hedge funds lack a formal or universally ac-
cepted definition, a hedge fund can be described as including
"any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, ad-
ministered by professional investment managers, and not
widely available to the public."14 The inclusion of the word
"hedge" would lead one to assume that a defining characteris-
tic of hedge funds is their use of hedging strategies. Although
hedge funds do commonly engage in trading strategies seek-
ing to insulate their investors from adverse market move-
ments, this is not always the case.' 5
Hedge funds are commonly structured as limited partner-
ships,16 raising capital from a number of investors who be-
13. For an excellent introduction into Alfred Wilfred Jones' biography,
investment style and philosophy, see generally SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE
MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE MAKING OF A NEw ELITE 15-39
(2010).
14. THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVER-
AGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONoTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (Apr. 1999).
15. Examining a large sample of hedge funds, Chen finds that the major-
ity of hedge funds trade derivatives. The use of derivatives is associated with
lower fund risks such as return volatility, downside risk, and extreme event
risk, as well as lower risk of fund failure in severe market conditions. These
characteristics indicate that hedge funds trade derivatives for hedging pur-
poses. SeeYong Chen, Derivatives Use and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Hedge
Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 1073 (2011).
16. Limited partnerships offer the advantage of pass-through tax treat-
ment of partnership profits. Tax liability on partnership profits is not in-
curred on the entity level, but is rather passed on to the investors. See Alan L.
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come limited partners.' 7 Investors are usually subject to sub-
scription and redemption limits and an initial lock-up period,
commonly set at one year, before they can redeem their inter-
ests.'8 The investment adviser/manager is responsible for run-
ning the fund and serves as a general partner.' In contrast,
limited partners are generally prohibited from participating in
the management of the fund and making investment deci-
sions.20
Hedge funds share unique characteristics that distinguish
them from other investment vehicles, most notably mutual
funds. First and foremost, hedge funds are able to operate rel-
atively unconstrained in liquid public markets by following a
wide variety of short-term investment strategies2 1 and employ-
ing sophisticated investment techniques such as short-selling,
derivatives trading, and leveraged investing - techniques that
are severely curtailed for mutual fund managers. 22 Further-
more, unlike mutual funds whose performance is measured by
Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAx LAW. 133, 136
(2003).
17. FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 86 (2006).
18. Id. at 29. This stands in sharp contrast to private equity funds which
lock up investor capital for the whole life of the fund, typically set at ten
years. See George W. Fenn et al., The Economics of the Private Equity Market 28
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Studies No. 168, 1995).
19. ScorrJ. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGUIATION § 2:2.1, 2-3 (2007).
20. LHABITANT, supra note 17, at 86.
21. While hedge funds invest in public markets seeking profitable oppor-
tunities, private equity funds concentrate their investments in illiquid securi-
ties. Unlike hedge funds, which pursue an investment strategy of finding
value, private equity is focused on creating value. Leveraged buyout funds,
the most famous category of private equity, invest in securities of private issu-
ers with the aim of increasing their long-term value. However, recent years
have seen hedge funds directly competing with private equity funds for
buyouts of companies. See generally Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Di-
vergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54
BUFF. L. REv. 251 (2006); Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis:
Global Convergence of Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 Nw. J. INT'i. L. & Bus.
603 (2009).
22. The Investment Company Act of 1940 in the U.S. severely limits the
use of leverage, derivatives and short selling by mutual funds. See Houman B.
Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail
Investors, 11 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 251, 283 (2008). The UCITS frame-
work in Europe governing mutual funds in essence prohibits short selling
and curtails the ability of funds to use derivatives and leverage. See AT-ANAS-
siou, supra note 5, at 104-07.
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reference to a market index, hedge funds seek absolute re-
turns.23 This pursuit is enhanced by the high-powered per-
formance-based compensation of hedge fund managers. Apart
from the management fee, typically set at 1-2% of assets under
management, hedge fund managers charge investors an incen-
tive fee, usually set at 20% of the fund's profits, which is widely
known as "carried interest."24 Finally, due to regulatory con-
straints, hedge funds are open only to qualified investors,25 al-
though recent years have seen the spread of products seeking
to offer the benefits of hedge fund investing to retail inves-
tors.26
23. See FRANCOIS SERGE L'HABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: MYrHS AND LIMITS 18
(2002).
24. A common contractual provision is the "high-water mark" which al-
lows the hedge fund manager to claim the carried interest only after previ-
ous losses of the fund have been recouped. See Ludwig Chincarini, Hedge
Funds - An Introduction, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE
EQurrY AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 13, 24 (Phoebus Athanassiou ed.,
2012). While "high-water marks" are common, "claw back" provisions requir-
ing the return of any incentive fee paid after the fund experiences subse-
quent losses are rarely used. See Alex Barker & Sam Jones, EU Hedge Funds
Face Pay Threat, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 13, 2012, at 13, available at http:
//www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a766a03e-e47d-11 el-affe-00144feab49a.html.
25. In order to evade various onerous regulatory requirements, hedge
funds are closed to retail investors and impose a high minimum investment
threshold. For a review of the U.S. regulations which hedge funds seek to
evade, see generally Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds:
Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 240, 252-60
(2009). Similar requirements can be found in individual European coun-
tries. For instance, Section 112(2) of the German Investment Act prohibits
hedge funds from being marketed publicly, thus allowing hedge fund mar-
keting only through private placement. Investmentgesetz [InvG] [Invest-
ment Act], Dec. 15, 2003, BUNDESGESETZBIArT [BGBL.] I at 2676, § 112(2)
(Ger.). In fact, as it will be explained below, the AIFM Directive, which will
replace the existing national private placement regimes, primarily regulates
the marketing of hedge funds to professional investors.
26. The most widespread products are funds of hedge funds, namely
funds which invest in multiple individual hedge funds. Recent developments
include: the initial public offerings of hedge fund managers, the prolifera-
tion of exchange-traded funds and indexes seeking to track the performance
of hedge funds, and the offering of mutual funds which use hedge-fund-like
strategies. See generally LHABITANT, supra note 23, at 579-90; Steven M. David-
off, Black Market Capital, 2008 CoLuM. Bus. L. REV. 172.
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The beneficial role of hedge funds in financial markets is
firmly acknowledged.27 By constantly trading in and out of
markets, hedge funds provide much needed liquidity to the
financial system.28 Operating unconstrained by burdensome
regulation and with high-powered performance incentives,
hedge funds are induced to exploit profitable albeit risky op-
portunities, thereby adding to risk diversification in the finan-
cial system and providing liquidity when other participants are
unwilling to do so. 29 Furthermore, acting as the prototypical
arbitrageurs betting against mispriced securities, hedge funds
help bring prices in financial markets closer to their funda-
mental value, thus contributing to market efficiency.3 0 Moreo-
ver, hedge funds play a unique role in the promotion of good
corporate governance. Referred to as "financial detectives,"
hedge funds have exposed some of the biggest corporate
frauds3' through their diligent research while the new breed
of activist hedge funds are further shaking up the cozy atmos-
27. Timothy F. Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Keynote Address at the National Conference on the Securities Industry:
Hedge Funds and Their Implications for the Financial System (Nov. 17,
2004); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman Fed. Reserve Board of Governors,
Speech at the New York University School of Law: Financial Regulation and
the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007).
28. Geithner, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Id. Although, one should note that arbitrageurs do face limits when
operating in markets and, therefore, their role in contributing to the effi-
ciency of markets is more limited than usually acknowledged. See generally
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Fi-
nance, J. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19.
31. James Chanos, President, Kynikos Assocs., Prepared Statement for
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds
(May 15, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedge
funds/hedge-chanos.htm) (offering a first-hand account of how hedge fund
Kynikos Associates uncovered Enron's accounting irregularities, leading to
the exposure of a spectacular corporate scandal). Another notorious case
was Bill Ackman's, then owner of hedge fund firm Gotham Partners LP, bet
against MBIA, an overleveraged AAA-rated bond insurer that was engaging
in accounting manipulation. MBIA suffered huge losses during the financial
crisis, and its rating was lowered to junk status. As a result, Ackman was able
to profit handsomely from MBIA's near-demise. For an excellent description
of Bill Ackman's crusade against MBIA see CHRISTINE S. RICHARDS, CONFI-
DENCE GAME: How HEDGE FUND MANAGER BILL ACKMAN CALLED WALL
STREET'S BLUFF (2011).
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phere that pervades boardrooms.32 Activist hedge funds buy
substantial blocks in undervalued companies and use this in-
fluence to advocate for changes in management and business
strategy.33 A novel phenomenon is the move of activism out of
32. See Ben Fox Rubin, Einhorn Sues Apple Over Preferred Stock Plan, WA..
ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424127887323452204578289811591849522.html (detailing the pres-
sure exerted by activist David Einhorn over Apple to return its huge cash pile
to shareholders); Chris Burritt & Katherine Burton, Bill Ackman Sells McDon-
aid's Stake After Stock Surges, BiOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=AZ6kcnn5qqUo (re-
porting activist investor's Bill Ackman successful pressure on McDonald's to
sell assets and increasing distributions to shareholders).
33. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. Riv. 1021, 1029 (2007). The present arti-
cle predominantly deals with hedge funds' impact on financial stability.
Therefore, hedge fund activism, which falls under the rubric of corporate
governance, is beyond the scope of our article. However, one should note
that hedge fund activism is increasingly gaining traction with activists target-
ing ever-bigger companies. The most prominent example is the recent fight
between hedge fund firm Greenlight Capital Inc. and Apple over the return
to shareholders of Apple's enormous cash hoard. See Ben Fox Rubin, Einhorn
Sues Apple over Preferred Stock Plan, WALL ST.J. (Feb. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM), http:
//online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 4241278873234522045782898115918495
22.html. The recent surge in activism has provoked an unfolding debate
among academics, practitioners and the judiciary regarding the promise and
perils of hedge fund activism. On the one hand, proponents of hedge fund
activism praise hedge funds' contributions to improving share price and op-
erational performance at target companies. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2
HARv. Bus. L. REv. 39 (2012); Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review,
4 FouNo. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009); Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63J. FIN. 1729 (2008); Alon Brav et
al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market
Competition (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,517,
2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17517.pdpnew-window
=1; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. Riv. (forthcoming Oct. 2013), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2248111. On the other hand, oppo-
nents of hedge fund activism-most notably Martin Lipton, the founder of
prominent U.S. law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and Leo Strine, the
current Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery-criticize their role
in provoking short-term focus by companies they invest in at the expense of
long-term value creation and the obscure tactics that activists employ in or-
der to amass their stake in the targets., such as the use of derivatives. See
generally Adam. 0. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some
Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and
Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. Bus. L. Riv. 135 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
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the public spotlight and into the "shadow" of the bankruptcy
process.
III.
REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS: A PRAGMATIc APPROACH
A. The Case for Regulating Hedge Funds
Proponents of stricter hedge fund regulation build their
case in favor of regulatory intervention on three distinct
grounds: (1) investor protection; (2) market integrity; and (3)
systemic stability. Pursuant to the investor protection rationale,
regulation is warranted by the high informational asymme-
tries, potential conflicts of interests, and agency costs that exist
between investors in hedge funds and their managers.35 How-
ever, investors in hedge funds are sophisticated, wealthy, and
able to "fend for themselves" by demanding adequate protec-
tions from fund managers before and during the life of their
investment.3 6 One should not forget that the hedge fund in-
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1 (2010); Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the
Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. ScH. F. ON CoRP. Gov-
ERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-
company-wreck-the-economy/. The debate has heated up since Wachtell's
petition to the SEC urging it to tighten the disclosure rules applying to
outside blockholders. Under current SEC rules, any shareholder acquiring
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of any class of publicly
traded securities in a public company must within ten days notify the SEC by
filing a Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (a), (i) (2013). The petition ad-
vocates in favor of shortening the ten-day period in which shareholders must
publicly disclose their acquisition of stock after they have reached five per-
cent ownership and including derivative positions in the calculation of the
five percent threshold. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 7, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf.
34. Activist distressed-debt investors purchase debt in a troubled com-
pany and use their rights as debtholders to control the restructuring process
and acquire the company by converting their debt into equity. See Michelle
M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 703 (2008).
35. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Reg-
ulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. l-. L. REv. 975 (2006).
36. FIN. ECONOMisTs ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT AND THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN.
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dustry is a highly competitive market. An incident commonly
used to justify hedge fund regulation is the Madoff scandal.
What is not usually mentioned, however, is that Madoff's firm
was not an unregulated and opaque hedge fund, but rather an
entity registered with the SEC and under its direct supervi-
sion.37
Another common criticism leveled against the industry
concerns the growing incidences of insider trading and the
propensity of hedge funds to engage in market manipula-
tion.38 While recent incidences of insider trading touching
upon star fund managers and the empirical data seem to sug-
gest that these concerns are not unfounded,39 the European
Union already has a comprehensive legislative framework in
place to combat insider trading and market manipulation. 40
MKTS. (Oct. 6, 1999), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%
20page/ferl999.pdf.
37. Bernard Madoff was able to run, under the SEC's radar, the largest
"Ponzi Scheme" in U.S. financial history with losses suffered by investors esti-
mated at over fifty billion dollars. Both Madoff's brokerage business and sep-
arate investment company were actually registered and regulated by the
SEC. See Editorial, Review & Outlook: Madoff & Markets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
2008, at A.18.
38. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, How Hedge Funds Create Criminals, HBR BLOG
NETWORK (Dec. 13, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/12/how
hedge-funds-createcrimina.html.
39. The latest incidence is the implication of a growing number of em-
ployees of SAC Capital, one of the most successful hedge funds, in insider
trading. See Michael Rothfield et al., Trading Charges Reach SAC, WALL ST. J.
Nov. 21, 2012, at A.1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424127887323713104578130930796204500.html. Regarding market
manipulation, recent research suggests that hedge funds engage in market
manipulation by bidding up prices on critical reporting dates in order to
reap higher fees. See Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock
Prices?, J. FIN. (forthcoming Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1763225.
40. Insider dealing and market manipulation in the E.U. are regulated
by the Market Abuse Directive, which governs dealings in instruments admit-
ted to listing in regulated markets. See Directive 2003/6/EC, of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on Insider Dealing
and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. The Euro-
pean Commission has recently adopted proposals for: a regulation which
will update the Market Abuse Directive and expand its application to instru-
ments traded on new trading platforms and over-the-counter markets, Propo-
sal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider Deal-
ing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2011) 651 final (Oct. 20,
2011); and, a directive imposing criminal sanctions for market abuse and
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The issue here is one of enforcement rather than regulation.
Indeed, regulators, most prominently the SEC, have, in the af-
termath of the financial crisis and the Madoff scandal, stepped
up their enforcement efforts against insider trading and mar-
ket manipulation by hedge funds.41 It follows, therefore, that
European regulators would emulate the example of the SEC
and increase their enforcement against hedge funds.
The sole rationale justifying regulatory intervention is the
repercussions that the failure of a large hedge fund or multi-
ple smaller hedge funds acting in correlated markets could
have on the stability of the financial system."2 Hedge funds
contribute to systemic risk via two channels, the credit channel
and the market channel. The credit channel refers to the im-
pact that the failure of a large leveraged fund (or multiple
smaller funds) could have on its creditors and other financial
institutions that act as counterparties" 3 Systemic risk through
the market channel can arise when adverse market movements
lead to the withdrawal of credit, tightening of collateral re-
quirements, collateral calls, and investor redemptions, forcing
leveraged hedge funds to liquidate their positions.44 The re-
insider trading, Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipula-
tion, COM (2011) 654 final (Oct. 20, 2011).
41. For instance, the SEC reached a $600M settlement with hedge fund
firm SAC Capital, which was the target of an insider trading investigation by
the agency. SeeJonathan Stempel & Katya Wachtel, Cohen's SAC to Pay $616
Million in SEC Insider Trade Settlement, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:08 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/us-sec-insidertrading-idUSBR
E92EOV720130315. See also SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager with
Insider Trading, WALl.. ST. J., (Oct. 16, 2009, 2:23 PM), available at http://
blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2009/10/16/sec-charges-billionaire-hedge-fund-
manager-with-insider-trading/ (reporting the arrest of billionaire hedge
fund manager Raj Rajaratnam for illegal insider trading); Juliet Chung, Fal-
cone Admits Wrongdoing, Agrees to Five-Year Ban, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 19, 2013),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014241278873236085045
79023123351192450.html (detailing the SEC's action against Philip Falcone
a billionaire hedge fund manager accused of illegal market manipulation).
42. LLYoD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMATIC
RISK 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MGI 236.pdf.
43. Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:
Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risk, 5 J. FIN. STABnrry 283, 290
(2009).
44. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macro-
economics, J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 29, 35.
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sulting decline in security prices leads to a further freezing of
credit and investor withdrawals prompting a new round of
forced sales. If this "death spiral" continues and spreads to
other investors as well, a financial crisis can develop quickly.45
However, one should note that in contrast to popular be-
liefs, hedge funds utilize leverage in a prudent manner, 4 6 with
prime brokers imposing strict leverage limits and adopting ad-
equate collateral and margin requirements,4 7 thus making it
unlikely that the failure of a hedge fund would have an impact
on its counterparties. In fact, the severe losses suffered by
hedge funds during the crisis leading to widespread failures
did not significantly impair their counterparties .4  Nonethe-
less, the widespread forced liquidations by financial institu-
tions including hedge funds which occurred during the crisis
and especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008 when short-term financing, such as commercial
paper and repurchase agreements, evaporated and the quant
45. Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Hearing
on Hedge Funds Before the H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 5
(2008) (written testimony of Andrew W. Lo, Harris & Harris Group Profes-
sor, MIT Sloan School of Management, and Chief Scientific Officer, Al-
phaSimplex Group, LLC).
46. Ang, Gorovyy and van Inwegen, investigating actual leverage ratios
obtained by a fund of hedge funds, find that average gross leverage includ-
ing derivatives exposures from December 2004 until October 2009 was at a
modest 2.1 times Net Asset Value. What is most interesting is that, compar-
ing hedge fund and finance sector leverage, the authors show that before
the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007, but also during the heights
of the crisis in 2008 and 2009, hedge funds were actually reducing their lev-
erage while bank leverage was shooting up. See Andrew Ang et al., Hedge Fund
Leverage, 102 J. FIN. EcON. 102 (2011); see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., AsSESSING
THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE
FSA's HEDGE FUND SURVEY AND HEDGE FUND AS COUNTERPARTY SURVEY 9
(Aug. 2012) (U.K) (finding that aggregate gross hedge fund leverage in-
cluding derivatives exposures remained modest at 3.8 times NAV from April
2010 until March 2012).
47. See Stephen Brown et al., Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and ETFs, in
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DoDD-FRANK AcT AND THE NEw ARCHITEC-
TURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 351, 353 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
48. See Lioo DIXON ET AL, supra note 42, at 41-42.
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meltdown of 200749 indicate that hedge funds can potentially
destabilize markets through the market channel.50
B. Hedge Funds and Financial Crises
Proponents of hedge fund regulation usually point to the
role that hedge funds played in various crises in order tojustify
a regulatory intervention. Criticism against hedge funds
started mounting after Soros's bet against the sterling showed
that the hedge fund industry was not a marginal player, but
rather a powerful force in financial markets. The Asian Finan-
cial Crisis of 1997 resulted in a populist outrage against hedge
funds that were vilified for speculating against the currencies
of Asian countries, especially Thailand and Malaysia.5 ' The
near failure of Long-Term Capital Management52 and the col-
lapse of Amaranth Advisors53 were the next worrying inci-
dents. While all of the abovementioned incidents were fol-
lowed by calls for regulating the hedge fund industry, the
E.U.'s regulatory spree was not the product of any thoughtful
analysis of the lessons learned from the previous crises, but
rather a hasty response to the recent double crises, the finan-
cial crisis of 2007 and the sovereign debt crisis still plaguing
Europe. Hedge funds were once again vilified for the failures
of regulators, politicians, and the banking system.
49. The quant meltdown refers to the widespread losses that a large num-
ber of quantitative long-short equity funds, which are supposed to be market
neutral, faced during the week of August 6, 2007. The losses were the result
of forced liquidations of similarly constructed portfolios triggering stop-loss
orders and leverage limits, thereby leading to further fire sales. See Amir E.
Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, Wat Happened to the Quants in August 2007?, J.
INVESTMENT MGMT., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 5.
50. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 44, at 40.
51. These allegations, however, were unsubstantiated. See Stephen J.
Brown et al., Hedge Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997 13 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6427, 1998), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w6427.pdf?new-window=1.
52. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Cap-
ital Management, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 189.
53. The largest hedge fund failure was the collapse of Amaranth, a Con-
necticut-based hedge fund that experienced spectacular losses as a result of
its natural gas trades. Its portfolio was bought byJPMorgan Chase and an-
other hedge fund, Citadel Investments, and thus Amaranth was allowed to
fail without jeopardizing financial stability. See MA-iABY, supra note 13, at
318-22.
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1. The Financial Crisis of 2007
The financial crisis of 2007 presented the perfect oppor-
tunity for E.U. regulators to bring the hedge fund industry
under their control. Long before the dust had settled and a
consensus about the causes of the crisis had been formed, poli-
ticians of Member States attacked the industry, accusing it of
being one of the architects of the crisis. 54 Hedge fund regula-
tion thus became a major pillar of the E.U.'s envisioned post-
crisis regulatory regime.
In 2008, at the height of the crisis, hedge funds were
fiercely criticized for aggravating market declines by spreading
false rumors about the health of financial institutions and
short selling their stocks, thus engaging in so-called "bear
raids."55 After intense lobbying by the banking industry, gov-
ernments around the world imposed bans on short selling. On
September 18, 2008, the SEC and the U.K. Financial Services
Authority ("FSA") introduced bans on short sales of financial
stocks. 56 The majority of governments around the world
adopted similar actions.57 The bans severely impacted hedge
54. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Sarkozy Turns on 'Predator' Hedge Funds,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 1, 2007, at 7, available at http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2808197/Sarkozy-turns-on-predator-
hedge-funds.html. For instance, Guilio Tremonti, the Italian Minister of Fi-
nance, described hedge funds as "hellish" and pushed for their complete
ban. See Tracy Corrigan, Hedge Funds Don't Need Punishing - They Are Suffering
Enough, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 17, 2008, at 5, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/tracycorrigan/3212102/Hedge-
funds-dont-need-punishing-they-are-suffering-enough.html.
55. These attacks were most famously led by Dick Fuld, last CEO of Leh-
man Brothers, whose failure sparked a widespread panic in financial mar-
kets. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Fuld Says Lehman Victim of Short Sellers,
FT.com (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f59fddOO-93b0-
11dd-9a63-0000779fdl8c.html#axzz2J75k8wAN; Bill Saporito, Are Short Sellers
to Blame for the Financial Crisis?, TIME (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.
time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1842499,00.html.
56. Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k) (2) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Devel-
opments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 18,
2008); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., SHORT SELLING (No. 2) INSTRUMENT 2008, FSA
2008/50 (Sept. 18, 2008) (relating to U.K. financial sector companies).
57. For an overview of the regulations restricting short selling after the
demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 from various governments
around the world, see JANE A. KANTER ET AL., DECHERT LLP, INTERNATIONAL
SHORT SELI.ING REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at
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funds since many of their trading strategies, such as market
neutral strategies, rely on short selling.5 8 Moreover, numerous
studies have concluded that the short selling bans slowed price
discovery and dampened liquidity without successfully sup-
porting the prices of financial stocks.59 Even the SEC has ac-
knowledged that it was mostly long sellers that drove the se-
vere price declines during September 2008.60
Hedge funds have also been accused of fueling the credit
and real estate boom by purchasing collateralized debt obliga-
tions ("CDOs"), the instruments at the heart of the subprime
crisis.6' Nonetheless, the total size of hedge funds devoted to
CDO trading was calculated to be around $7 billion as of July
2007, which represented only a small percentage of the overall
CDO market.62 Indeed, banks continue to be the main holders
http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/c998f66d-7cae4738-9dc9-00cf9a
86fe22/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/00bl 6ff9-c57f-42fd-a8cd-00fab
a4e5349/FS_25_09-08_InternationalShort Selling Regulation.pdf.
58. Market neutral strategies, in essence, seek to neutralize market risk.
An example is a convertible arbitrage strategy where the investor seeks to
exploit the mispricing between the undervalued convertible bond and the
overvalued underlying stock by taking a long position in the bond and short-
ing the stock. See generally LH-ABITANT, supra note 17, at 269-95; Louise Story,
A Debate as a Ban on Short-Selling Ends: Did It Make Any Diference?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2008), at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/busi
ness/08short.html?_r=0.
59. See Robert Battalio et al., Market Declines: What is Accomplished by Ban-
ning Short-Selling?, 18 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., New York, N.Y.), no. 5, 2012, at 1; Alessandro Beber & Marco Pagano,
Short-Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, 68 J. FIN.
343 (2013); Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008
Shorting Ban 3 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
EDHEC-Risk Institute).
60. Memorandum from Office of Economic Analysis, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, to Distribution List on Analysis of the July Emergency Order Re-
quiring a Pre-Borrow on Short Sales (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales/oeamemoOl 1409.pdf.
61. See Photis Lysandrou, The Primacy of Hedge Funds in the Subprime Crisis,
34 J. PosT KEYNESIAN ECoN. 225 (2011). A collateralized debt obligation-
commonly referred to as a CDO-is a debt security issued by a special pur-
pose vehicle and backed by a portfolio of assets such as mortgage-backed
securities. The debt securities are usually divided into several tranches with
different seniorities and different ratings.
62. Hedge Funds and the Financial Market Hearing on Hedge Funds Before the
H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) [hereinafter
"Hearings"] (written testimony of Houman B. Shadab, Senior Research Fel-
low, The Mercatus Center at George Mason University). The size of the CDO
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of CDO securities.63 Furthermore, one has to take into ac-
count the reasons behind the growth of the CDO market. The
CDO market was in essence created in response to the growing
demand of institutional investors for highly rated securities of-
fering attractive returns. Unlike institutional investors who
were the main investors in the highly rated tranches of CDO
deals, hedge funds concentrated their investments in the more
speculative lower rated tranches and equity tranches.64
As one can easily discern, the foundations of the Euro-
pean Union's response were rather unstable. Hedge funds
were not the villains, but rather the victims of the crisis that
paralyzed the global financial system. Faced with a drying up
of funding liquidity due to withdrawals from panicked inves-
tors, margin calls, and the freezing of credit markets, hedge
funds were forced to deleverage massively and exit their posi-
tions in the stock market at a loss. These exits led to more
investor withdrawals and margin calls, thus creating a vicious
cycle. 65
2. Hedge Funds and the Sovereign Debt Crisis
The current sovereign debt crisis in Europe started in
2010 when fears regarding the solvency of Greece led investors
to massively flee Greek sovereign bonds, shutting the country
out of financial markets, and forcing it to resort to a joint E.U.-
market in the U.S., the main market for CDOs, was estimated at around $900
billion in 2007. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
FINANCIAL MARKET TURBULENCE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND POLICIES 16
(2007), available at www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/02/pdf/
text.pdf.
63. ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, THE ROLE OF CREDIT HEDGE FUNDS IN THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ASSET MANAGERS, NOT SHADow BANKS 11 (2012), available
at http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/446286DC-FB7C-
4AF6-96C83E65E2A6BDF5.
64. Hearings, supra note 62, at 9 (written testimony of Houman B.
Shadab). In a CDO deal, the equity tranche represents the most speculative
tranche, which stands to be wiped out first in case of default or losses in the
underlying mortgage backed securities backing the debt securities issued by
the special purpose vehicle. See GUNTER MEISSNER, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: Ar-
LICATION, PRICING, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 45 (2005).
65. See Itzhak Ben-David et al., Hedge Fund Stock Trading in the Financial
Crisis of 2007-2009, 25 REv. FIN. STUD. 1 (2012) (documenting that in each of
the third and fourth quarters of 2007 and 2008 hedge funds reduced their
equity holding in U.S. stocks by about 5% and 15%, respectively).
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International Monetary Fund (hereinafter "IMF") bailout.66
Markets soon turned their attention to Ireland and Portugal,
who in turn had to resort to a bailout package.67 The crisis
spread to the core of the Eurozone with Spain and Italy facing
increased borrowing costs and the Eurozone showing real
signs of financial disintegration. 68 The threat of a disorderly
Greek exit from the Eurozone, as well as questions about the
ability and/or willingness of Europe's richest countries to bail
out Spain and Italy, put the very existence of the euro and the
Eurozone in doubt.69 The last few years following the onset of
the crisis have seen the adoption of hastily conceived and un-
realistic bailout packages,70 a never-ending saga of Greek
66. Charles Forelle & Alkman Granitsas, Greece Asks for $60 Billion Bailout,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2010), at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424052748703709804575201330937572258.html.
67. See Patricia Kowsmann, Portugal Bailout Plan Detailed, WAL ST. J. (May
5, 2011), at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748703937104576302883922114642.html; Marcus Walker et al., Ailing Ire-
land Accepts Bailout, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2010), at Al, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052748703567304575628362883493310
.html.
68. Liz Alderman & Matthew Saltmarsh, Worries Rise over Spain and Italy
Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/
business/global/pressure-builds-on-italy-and-spain-over-finances.html?page
wanted=all&-r=0. At the height of the crisis, depositors in Southern Euro-
pean countries, who were worried about the solvency of national banks ex-
posed to sovereign debt, were massively transferring funds to the stronger
Northern countries. See David Enrich et al., Europe Banks Fear a Flight, WALL
ST. J. (May 21, 2012), at C8, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052702304019404577416200222787714.htm. Indeed, regulators of
Northern countries started ring-fencing their national banking systems, pro-
tecting them against infection by the sovereign debt crisis. An example was
Unicredit's transfer of funds from its healthy German subsidiary to its Italian
parent company at a time when the bank was facing a liquidity squeeze. The
move provoked the intervention of the German banking regulator, BaFin.,
with Italian regulators pushing back, thus sparking a clash. See David Enrich
& Alessandra Galloni, Turmoil Frays Ties Across Continent, WALL ST.J. (May 31,
2012), at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00014240527023
04065704577426560281463958.html.
69. David Gauthier-Villars & Charles Forelle, Downgrades Fan Fresh Euro
Fears, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI000142
4052970203735304577162832015883536.html.
70. A prominent example is the first Greek bailout package. In return for
obtaining funds from the EU and the IMF, Greece committed to adopt pain-
ful austerity measures and structural reforms aimed at cutting its budget def-
icit from an astronomical 13.6% to 3% in just three years. See Lefteris
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bailouts, debt restructurings and buybacks,7 i profound
changes to the Eurozone's institutional arrangements, 72 and
the slowing of the Eurozone economy.
The new crisis again provoked a search for scapegoats.
Hedge funds soon became a populist target blamed for caus-
ing and/or aggravating the sovereign debt crisis by using wolf
pack tactics 74 to attack the euro and individual countries'
bonds. Soon after Greece started seeing its refinancing costs
Papadimas & Jan Strupczewski, EU, IMF Agree $147 Billion Bailout for Greece,
REUTERS (May 2, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/
02/us-eurozone-idUSTRE6400PJ20100502. Various commentators immedi-
ately criticized the plan as unworkable arguing that front-loaded austerity
would depress demand and increase unemployment thereby diminishing
any gains from spending cuts and tax increases. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein,
Why Greece Will Default, PROJECr SYNDICATE (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.
project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-greece-will-default.
71. See Steven Castle, Europe Agrees on New Bailout to Help Greece Avoid De-
fault, N.Y. TIMIs (Feb. 21, 2012), at Al, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/02/21/world/europe/agreement-close-on-a-bailout-for-greece-
european-finance-ministers-say.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Charles Forelle,
Greece Defaults, and Tries to Move on, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2012), at A6, availa-
ble at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020460300457727054
2625035960.html; Stelios Bouras et al., Greece's Buyback Effort Advances, WALL
ST.J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241
27887324024004578173080175399670.html; Rachel Donadio, Growing Air of
Concern in Greece over New Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.ny
times.com/2012/02/22/world/europe/euro-zone-leaders-agree-on-new-
greek-bailout.html.
72. In response to the financial and sovereign debt crises, the European
Union has moved towards greater political and economic integration by put-
ting forth proposals for the creation of a single bank supervisor, a common
framework for the resolution of banks and the guarantee of deposits, and
fiscal oversight rules, among other bailout mechanisms. See William Boston
et al., German Lawmakers Approve Broadened EFSF, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052970203687504576654531439
758862.html; Laurence Norman, Europeans Reach Deal on Fiscal Oversight
Rules, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323864304578316191467424574.html; John O'Donnell &
Robin Emmott, Europe Deepens Union with ECB as Chief Bank Watchdog,
REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
12/13/us-eu-banking-idUSBRE8BBOO820121213.
73. James Fontanella-Khan, Eurozone Slides Back into Recession, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2012), at 8, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a5055
32-2efd-11e2-b88b-0144feabdcO.html.
74. In this context, a wolf-pack tactic can be defined as hedge funds act-
ing together to make coordinated bets against securities in order to drive
down their prices. See Nick Dunbar, An Imaginary Wolf-Pack, NICK DUNBAR
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rise, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, joined by
other EU politicians - most notably Nicolas Sarkozy, then Pres-
ident of France - led a campaign against hedge fund specula-
tors and the use of naked credit default swaps on sovereign
debt, accusing them of driving up the funding costs of Euro-
pean governments.75 During the crisis, European regulators
adopted uncoordinated measures banning naked credit de-
fault swaps of Eurozone government bonds and short selling
of financial stocks.76
Nonetheless, the allegations that speculative trading of
CDS on sovereign debt was driving the drop in the underlying
bond prices (thereby increasing borrowing costs for Eurozone
governments, especially Greece) had little to do with reality.
The overwhelming majority of studies, including, most impor-
tantly, the report of the European Commission's intra-service
task force (a group set up to examine the effects of CDS trad-
ing on the sovereign debt crisis) have concluded either that
the changes in spreads in sovereign CDS and bond markets
were either mainly contemporaneous, or in the case that price
changes in the CDS markets did actually lead changes in the
underlying bond markets, the changes in CDS spreads were
linked to fundamentals responding to country-specific
events.77
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.nickdunbar.net/articles-and-reviews/an-
imaginary-wolf-pack/.
75. See Tracy Corrigan, Attacking Speculators Is a Good Bet for Troubled
Politicians, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 12, 2010, at 5, available at http:/
/www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/7423145/Attacking-
speculators-is-a-good-bet-for-troubled-politicians.htinl. A naked credit de-
fault swap is a credit default swap in which the buyer does not own the un-
derlying debt against which protection is sought. See Rend M. Stulz, Financial
Derivatives: Lessons from the Subprime Crisis, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter
2009, at 58, 70.
76. Alan Crawford, Germany to Temporarily Ban Naked Short Selling, Some
Swaps of Euro Bonds, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-1 8 /germany-to-start-temporary-ban-on-
naked-short-selling-of-euro-bonds-banks.html; Brooke Masters, European
Short-Selling Ban Comes Under Attack, FIN. TIMEs (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:14 PM),
http://www.ft.comn/intl/cms/s/0/763al85e-c4el-11 e0-9c4d-00l44feabdcO.
html.
77. See SARAI CRIADO ET AL., REPORT ON SOVEREIGN CDS (2011), available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Reportonsovereign
CDS12072010.pdf (finding no evidence of mispricing in either the bond or
CDS markets and that spread changes in these two markets were mainly con-
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IV.
THE E.U.'s REGULATORY RESPONSE
A. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
As previously discussed, immediately after the eruption of
the financial crisis, E.U. politicians started attacking the hedge
fund industry, voicing their determination to bring it under
the regulatory radar. On April 29, 2009, regulators put their
proposal on the table. The hedge fund industry, whose lobby-
ing power at that time was rather weak, was taken by surprise.78
The initial Commission proposal has been described as protec-
tionist and ill-thought, at best.79 The most controversial ele-
ments of the proposal were its "one size fits all" approach, the
authorization granted to the Commission to regulate the use
of leverage and short-selling and provisions, which essentially
created a fortress around Europe by severely restricting the
marketing of non-E.U.-based funds in Europe. 0 After long
and heated negotiations and a politicized clash between, on
one side, the U.K. and the hedge fund industry and, on the
temporaneous); see also DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, MONTHLY REPORT (Dec.
2010) (concluding that although the CDS markets of peripheral countries
were leading their bond markets in price discovery, the changes in CDS
prices were the result of country-specific events). Similarly, Gary Gorton
claims that CDS trading has actually made bond prices more information-
sensitive. CDS markets allow traders to trade on information where it would
otherwise not be profitable to do so in the underlying bond markets due to
the relative difficulty of trading bonds. Therefore, CDS contribute to market
efficiency by revealing information which then gets impounded in bond
prices. See Gary Gorton, Are Naked CDS Too Revealing?, INV. DEAL.ERS' DIG.
(June 4, 2010), at 22. But see Anne-Laure Delatte et al., Has the CDS Market
Influenced the Borrowing Cost of European Countries During the Sovereign Crisis?,
31 J. INT'L MONEY & FIN. 481 (2012) (finding that during market stress the
CDS market leads the price discovery process and suggesting that, in the
case of Greece, CDS were used in order to speculate against the onerous
condition of the Greek economy).
78. Cornelia Woll, Beyond Ideological Battles: A Strategic Analysis of Hedge
Fund Regulation in Europe 12-13 (Les Cahiers europ6ens de Sciences Po. No.
2, 2011), available at http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2011
2.pdf.
79. Eilis Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private
Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 379 (2011).
80. For an overview of the relevant provisions and the concerns raised,
see Phoebus Athanassiou & Thomas Bullman, The EU's AHFM Directive and Its
Impact - An Overview, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQ,
urlY AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, supra note 24, at 442, 444-51.
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other, Germany and especially France,8 ' the final text of the
Directive was adopted on November 16, 2011.
The Directive's goals were the creation of a harmonized
Pan-European regulatory framework for alternative investment
fund managers ("AIFMs") and a genuine internal market for
their activities. The rationales behind the adoption of the Di-
rective were a perceived lack of adequate investor protection
and the role of hedge funds in aggravating and/or amplifying
systemic risk. The Directive adopted a "one size fits all ap-
proach" encompassing E.U. domiciled AIFMs managing alter-
native investment funds ("AIFs") irrespective of whether they
are E.U. based or not and non-E.U. AIFMs managing and/or
marketing AIFs in the E.U.82 The definition of an AIFM cov-
ered any "legal person whose regular business is managing one
or more AIFs."8 3 Therefore, the application of the Directive
extended to a broad array of AIFMs including hedge fund, pri-
vate equity fund, real estate fund, and commodity capital fund
managers. As Jennifer Payne has noted though, the target of
EU regulators was primarily hedge funds, but other industries,
such as private equity, were swept along.84
The Directive provides for the mandatory authorization of
AIFMs by the competent authorities subject to compliance
with its provisions. A de minimis exemption is granted to man-
agers managing AIFs with assets of less than EUR 100 million
or less than EUR 500 million if the funds are unleveraged and
offer no redemption rights for the first five years. This exemp-
tion was premised on the insignificance of small funds to over-
81. Angela Monaghan, U.K. Coalition Faces First Test as Germany, France
Push for Tough EU Hedge Fund Rules, TELEGRAPH (May 14, 2010, 5 :30 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ newsbysector/banksandfinance/772
1923/UK-coalition-faces-first-test-as-Germany-France-push-for-tough-EU-
hedge-fund-rules.html.
82. AIFM Directive, supra note 10, art. 2, at 14.
83. Id. art. 8, at 21. AIFs are defined as "collective investment undertak-
ings ... which raise capital from a number of investors with a view to invest-
ing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those
investors and [which] do not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of
Directive 2009/65/EC" (alternatively referred to as UCITS Directive). Id.
art. 4(1) (a), at 16.
84. Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. Bus.
ORG. L. RIiv. 559, 582 (2011).
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all financial stability.8 5 In order to obtain authorization, hedge
fund managers must furnish to the competent authorities de-
tailed information concerning among other things, their in-
vestment strategies, their risk profiles, the use of leverage, and
the identity of their owners.86 Furthermore, AIFMs must com-
ply with minimum initial and ongoing capital requirements.87
Moreover, the AIFM Directive imposes a wide range of re-
quirements regarding risk management, conduct of business,
and corporate governance. Managers of hedge funds must im-
plement robust risk and liquidity management systems" and
devise arrangements for identifying and managing any con-
flicts of interest that would jeopardize the interests of the AIFs
it manages or their investors.89 Limits on leverage must be set
by AIFMs themselves while national authorities may impose
limits in order to protect financial stability.90 Additionally, the
Directive requires AIFMs to adopt sound remuneration poli-
cies and introduces remuneration restrictions for "identified
staff' whose professional activities may adversely affect the risk
profile of the fund(s) managed.9'
The AIFM Directive also imposes stringent depositary and
valuation requirements. Most importantly, a fund manager will
85. AIFM Directive, supra note 10, art. 3, at 15. The threshold of EUR 500
million has in essence been created for private equity funds which do not
utilize leverage on a fund level and offer no redemption rights to investors
until the liquidation of the fund typically after 10 years. In the hedge fund
context, the relevant threshold will be usually inapplicable since the over-
whelming majority of hedge funds utilize leverage and offer short lock-up
periods.
86. Id. art. 7, at 20.
87. Id. art. 9, at 22.
88. Id. arts. 15-16, at 24-25.
89. Id. art. 14, at 24.
90. Id. art. 25(3), at 35.
91. See id. art. 13, at 24 & Annex II (1), at 70-71. In order to ensure
prudent risk-taking, remuneration to identified staff including carried inter-
est must be paid in both fixed and variable components with a minimum of
40%-60% of variable remuneration deferred and at least 50% of it paid in
equity or in equity-linked instruments of the AIF(s) managed. See id. Annex
II(1) (m)-(n), at 70-71. In addition, ex post risk adjustment of performance-
related remuneration should be achieved through malus and clawback ar-
rangements. See id. Annex II(1) (o), at 71. Remuneration committees staffed
by non-executives must also be set up depending on the sophistication of the
manager. Id. Annex 11 (3), at 71.
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have to appoint a single depositary for each AIF managed. 92
Pursuant to article 21(12), a depositary will be liable for any
loss of financial instrument held by it or by any third party to
whom custody has been delegated, except for any external
event beyond its reasonable control and only if all possible
precautions had been taken.93 This provision introducing a
near strict liability regime is expected to significantly raise fees
charged by depositaries thus lowering investor returns.9" Fund
managers must also ensure that AIF assets are valued at least
once per year either externally or, subject to certain require-
ments, internally. 95
Disclosure requirements towards investors and supervisors
are aimed at enhancing the transparency of the industry and
alleviating investor protection and systemic stability concerns.
AIFMs must make specific information available to investors
prior to their investment in a fund and periodically thereaf-
ter.96 In addition, an annual report for each fund managed or
marketed in the E.U. must be provided to the AIFM's compe-
tent authority and to investors on request.97 Disclosures must
also be made to the regulatory authorities regarding the main
markets in which the AIFM trades, the principal exposures,
and most importantly concentrations of each fund managed.98
One positive development is the creation of a genuine in-
ternal market for hedge funds, which was made possible by
regulations that grant AIFMs a Pan-European passport with re-
spect to their management and marketing activities. E.U.-
based managers will be allowed to manage E.U.-funds across
the E.U. and market them to E.U. professional investors imme-
diately after the Directive's entry into force.99 E.U.-AIFMs may
also manage non-E.U. AIFs if authorized pursuant to the Di-
rective. 00 Nonetheless, E.U.-AIFMs managing non-E.U. AIFs
92. Id. art. 21, at 28-32.
93. Id. art. 21(12), at 31.
94. Phil Davis, Custodian Banks Balk at AJFM Rules, FIN. TIMFs (London)
(Jan. 7, 2013), at 12, available at http://www.ft.comn/intl/cms/s/0/12bdc7
78-37c5-1 1e2-a97e-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2NO2WyaAD.
95. AIFM Directive, supra note 10, art. 19, at 26-27.
96. Id. art. 23, at 33-34.
97. Id. art. 22, at 32-33.
98. Id. art. 24(1), at 34.
99. Id. art. 32, at 4041.
100. Id. art. 34, at 42.
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and non-E.U. AIFMs managing AIFs (both E.U. and non-E.U.-
domiciled) will not be able to benefit from this regime until
2015, when the passport is expected to take effect.10' Until
then, marketing to professional investors in the E.U. will be
subject to national private placement regimes.
Overall, one could argue that the Directive is based on
dubious foundations. Despite being adopted on the premise
that the hedge fund industry contributed to the financial crisis
of 2007, there is an absence of evidence that hedge funds
caused or aggravated the crisis.10 2 Furthermore, regulating
hedge funds from an investor protection perspective makes lit-
tle sense. Investors in hedge funds are sophisticated and have
the necessary expertise and bargaining power to "fend for
themselves." 0 3 As a result, various onerous provisions, such as
disclosure and conduct of business requirements, impose
costly and unnecessary standardization in an environment
where investors are able to negotiate and obtain their pre-
ferred arrangements.104 One major shortcoming of this ap-
proach is the creation of a false sense of security to investors,
disincentivizing them from conducting careful due diligence
and monitoring.
Judged against its stated goals, namely reducing exposure
to systemic risk and protecting investors, the Directive does
not fare much better. For instance, the power granted to na-
tional authorities to impose limits on leverage for protecting
financial stability can have the exact opposite effect. Imposing
limits during market stress will lead to deleveraging and forced
101. Id. arts. 35-42, at 42-56, art. 67(6), at 65.
102. Indeed, hedge funds do not feature at all in leading analyses of the
causes of the crisis. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 75
(2009) (suggesting that the immediate causes of the crisis were "the conflu-
ence of risky lending with inadequate personal savings," along with the col-
lapse of the housing bubble and low interest rates); ANDREW Ross SORKIN,
Too BIG TO FAIL 534 (2009) (noting that the "seeds of disaster" included
bank deregulation, low interest rates, and a system of Wall Street compensa-
tion that rewarded short-term risk-taking).
103. FIN. ECONOMIsTs ROUNDTABLE, supra note 36.
104. Franklin R. Edwards, The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Financial Stability
and Investor Protection, in HEDGE FUNDs: RISKS AND REGULATION 30, 42-44.
(Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2004) (for example, requiring dis-
closure of a hedge fund's trading activity may be impractical and uninforma-
tive since hedge funds may have tens of thousands of positions that even
financially sophisticated investors may not be able to decipher).
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asset liquidations which will aggravate market declines. 05 Fur-
thermore, the de minimis exemption for small funds does not
sit very well from an investor protection perspective. One
would expect that the potential for fraud would be greater in
smaller funds employing unsophisticated systems and controls.
In addition, the remuneration restrictions are particularly in-
appropriate for owner-managed funds, which comprise the
majority of hedge funds. 06
Two positive aspects of the Directive are the disclosure of
information to supervisors, which allows them to monitor sys-
temic risk and the introduction of a passport regime, which
will positively affect both investors and the hedge fund indus-
try by lowering the costs of cross-border marketing. Overall,
the Directive is expected to significantly raise costs for hedge
funds operating in Europe. Indeed a study commissioned by
the FSA regarding the original Commission Proposal con-
cluded that one-off compliance costs could amount up to EUR
3.2 billion whereas ongoing costs could exceed EUR 1.4 bil-
lion per year.'07
B. Batting with the Shorts: The Short Selling Regulation
Momentum for the regulation of short selling began to
build during the 2007 financial crisis as the demise of banks
was attributed in part to short selling and especially "bear
raids." The Greek crisis created the requisite sense of urgency.
Criticism against short selling and outcries against hedge
funds were intertwined as hedge funds were seen as the main
perpetrators of manipulative and destabilizing short selling. As
a result, shortly after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis,
the European Commission moved forward with a proposal for
105. Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation, 5 L. & FIN. MAR-
KETS REv. 119 (forthcoming 2011).
106. See Comment Letter from Richard H. Baker, President & CEO, Man-
aged Funds Ass'n, to European Sec. & Mkts. Auth. 4, 9 (Sept. 27, 2012),
available at https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
MFA-comment-letter-on-ESMA-remuneration-guidelines.pdf (responding to
European Securities and Markets Authority's request for public consultation
on its guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD).
107. KYLA MALCOLM ET AL., CHARLES RIVER Assocs., IMPACT OF THE PRO-
POSED AIFM DIRECTIVE ACRoss EUROPE 112-13 (2009).
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the regulation of short selling. 08 The final Short Selling Regu-
lation came into force on March 14, 2012. The Regulation
seeks to regulate E.U. government bonds as well as covered
and naked short selling of shares admitted to trading on an
E.U. regulated market or multilateral trading facility.' 09 Its
main aims are to enhance transparency by forcing market play-
ers to disclose their positions, address settlement failure
risk,110 and prevent negative price spirals.
Under the Short Selling Regulation, significant net short
positions in shares must be disclosed both to supervisory au-
thorities and the market. Net short positions in shares, ob-
tained after deducting any long positions from any short posi-
tions, must be disclosed to regulators once they reach 0.2% of
the issued share capital and for any 0.1% increase thereaf-
ter."' Disclosures to the public must be made at a higher 0.5%
threshold and for each 0.1% above that." 2 Short and long po-
sitions also include derivative positions.' 3
108. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, COM (2010) 482 final
(Sept. 15, 2010).
109. Short selling refers to the practice of selling a security without the
seller actually owning it at the time of the sale. In a short sale, the seller will
sell a security borrowed by a third-party lender and purchase an identical
security at a later date to be returned to the lender. The short seller stands
to profit from any decline in the price of the security between the sale and
the repurchase. In a covered short sale, the seller will already have borrowed
the security or entered into arrangements to borrow the security at the time
of the sale. In a naked short sale, on the other hand, the seller will not have
borrowed the security or entered into any arrangements to do so at the time
of the sale. The seller hopes that he will be able to borrow and deliver the
security to the buyer by the settlement date, which is usually three business
days after the date of the sale. Abusive naked short selling occurs when the
seller does not intend to borrow and deliver the securities to the buyer but
instead seeks to create artificial supply in order to drive its price. SeeJennifer
Payne, The Regulation of Short Selling and its Reform in Europe, 13 EUR. Bus.
ORG. L. REV. 413, 414-15 (2012).
110. One should note that settlement failure risk can also occur, apart
from abusive naked short selling, in instances where the lending market has
become illiquid, leaving the naked short seller unable to borrow the shares.
111. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, art. 5(2), at 10.
112. Id. art. 6(2), at 11.
113. See id. art. 3(1)-(2), at 9 (defining a short and long sale as a transac-
tion which confers a financial advantage in the event of a decrease or an
increase, respectively, in the value of a share or debt instrument).
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Regarding net short positions in sovereign debt, the Regu-
lation creates two different categories of issuers and mandates
disclosure solely to regulators. For sovereign issuers with less
than EUR 500 billion of outstanding debt, the initial threshold
is set at 0.1% with additional disclosure for any 0.05% increase
thereafter.' " Disclosure is triggered at 0.5% with ongoing dis-
closure obligations for any 0.25% increase for issuers with
more than EUR 500 billion of debt or where a liquid futures
market for the debt exists. 5 The reporting thresholds are
monetary amounts published on the website of the European
Securities Market Authority calculated after applying the
above thresholds to the debt of each individual sovereign is-
suer. Short and long positions also encompass derivatives and
CDS on sovereign debt." Notifications both in relation to net
short positions in shares and sovereign debt must be made no
later than 3:30 PM the following trading day." 7 An exemption
from the disclosure requirements is granted for primary mar-
ket operations by dealers to assist sovereign issuers and mar-
ket-making activities." 8
Seeking to address settlement failure risk and abusive na-
ked short selling, the Regulation introduces a "super locate"
rule making naked short sales considerably more difficult to
execute." 9 Short selling is allowed only when the seller has
borrowed or entered into an agreement to borrow the share
or sovereign debt instrument or has an arrangement with a
third party confirming that the share or sovereign debt instru-
ment has been located and settlement can reasonably be ex-
pected to be effected. 2 0 Furthermore, a mandatory buy-in
procedure is introduced for settlement failures. If the seller
114. Commission Delegated Regulation 918/2012, art. 21(7)(a), (8)(a),
2012 O.J. (L 274) 1, 10 (EU).
115. Id., art. 21(7) (b), (8) (b).
116. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, art. 3(3), at 9.
117. Id. art. 9(2), at 11.
118. Id. art. 17, at 15-16.
119. However, exemptions are granted for market-making activities and
primary market operations in sovereign debt conducted by dealers. See id.
120. See id. art. 12(1), at 12-13, art. 13(1), at 13. In order to safeguard the
liquidity of underlying bond markets, the Regulation permits national regu-
lators to suspend these restrictions on naked short selling when the liquidity
of their debt market falls below a certain threshold. See id. art. 13(3), at 13.
Additionally, the "super locate" restrictions are not applicable if the short
sale hedges a long position in a sovereign debt instrument, the pricing of
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fails to deliver the shares within four days of settlement being
due, the central counterparty must buy-in the shares in order
to ensure smooth settlement.' 2 1 Where a buy-in is not possible,
cash compensation is paid to the buyer. 122 The seller must re-
imburse the central counterparty for the costs of the buy-in or
cash compensation.1 23
In response to the perceived role of short selling in aggra-
vating market declines, national regulators are granted addi-
tional powers in exceptional circumstances. In case of adverse
market developments threatening financial stability, national
regulators may impose additional disclosure obligations for
net short positions in specific financial instruments or classes
of instruments, request any party lending a specific financial
instrument or classes of instruments to send notice of any
change in the fees requested for such lending, or impose tem-
porary bans on short selling and sovereign credit default trans-
actions.24 Irrespective of whether there are general adverse
market developments, national regulators are granted the
power to ban or restrict short selling in a financial instrument
if there is a significant decline in the price of the relevant in-
strument.12 5 The ban is temporary and shall last until the next
trading day following the day on which the price decline oc-
curs. 126 National regulators also have the power to extend the
ban for an additional two days if the price continues to signifi-
cantly drop in value at the end of second trading day.' 27 Signif-
icantly, naked CDS on sovereign debt are prohibited. A CDS
on sovereign debt can only be used in order to hedge a long
position in the sovereign debt of the issuer or a position in
assets or liabilities whose value is correlated to the value of the
sovereign debt.128
which is highly correlated with the pricing of a given sovereign debt. See id.
art. 13(2), at 13.
121. Id. art. 15(1) (a), at 14.
122. Id. art. 15(1)(b), at 14.
123. Id. art. 15(1) (c), at 14.
124. Id. arts. 19-21, at 16-17.
125. Id. art. 23(1), at 17.
126. Id. art. 23(2), at 17.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 14, at 14. The ban on uncovered CDS may be lifted by a com-
petent authority if the authority concludes that the ban might negatively im-
pact the sovereign CDS market by increasing the issuer's cost of borrowing
or affecting the issuer's ability to issue sovereign debt. Id. art. 14(2), at 14.
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The adoption of the Regulation was heavily influenced by
popular beliefs regarding the causes of the financial and sover-
eign debt crises and can be considered to be an effort by E.U.
regulators to indirectly curb hedge fund activity by regulating
one of their main investment techniques. The problematic as-
pects of the Regulation are the very low disclosure thresholds,
the "super locate" requirement, and the temporary bans it au-
thorizes. While disclosure of short positions enhances market
efficiency, the threshold has been set at unacceptably low
levels. Considering that long positions have additional disclo-
sure requirements,'12 the E.U. in essence treats two market
participants-long buyers and short sellers-in different ways,
thus distorting markets and the efficient allocation of capital.
A lower disclosure threshold is likely to chill short selling
activity in Europe, which is where hedge funds dominate short
sales.'3 0 On one hand, a low disclosure threshold will quickly
alert company executives and market competitors of the short
seller's activities, allowing them to retaliate in a variety of ways
including legal actions and short squeezes.' 3 ' On the other
129. Member States of the E.U. must ensure that a shareholder acquiring
more than 5% of the voting rights of an issuer whose shares are admitted to
trading on a regulated market notifies the issuer of the acquisition. See Direc-
tive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 De-
cember 2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Rela-
tion to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading
on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 9(1),
2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, 47.
130. See OLIVER WYMAN, THE EFFEcrs OF SHORT-SELLING PUBLIc Disci.o-
SURE REGIMES ON EQurry MARKETS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND Eu-
ROPEAN MARKETS 5 (2010), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/
downloads/Oliver WymanFinancialServicesReport.pdf (elaborating on
these points and finding that short selling disclosure hampers liquidity by
lowering trading volumes and increasing bid-ask spreads). Indeed, disclo-
sure is associated with a large drop in short selling activity. Although the
study seems to suggest that any public disclosure would be detrimental, our
article advocates for a disclosure regime for short selling activity comparable
to the regime for long positions. Such a disclosure regime will promote mar-
ket efficiency while allowing short sellers to profit from their activity. In addi-
tion, a disclosure regime will also chill manipulative activity by short sellers.
131. A short-squeeze refers to the situation where the price of a stock rises
sharply, forcing investors who have sold the stock to rush to buy it in order
to close their positions, thus driving the prices even higher and amplifying
their losses. See Sarah Marsh, Short-Sellers Make VW the World's Priciest Company,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2008/10/28/us-volkswagen-idUSTRE49R3I920081028 (reporting how short-
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hand, the short seller's profits depend on the short position
he is able to build until his activity becomes public, at which
point other market participants will capitalize on the short
seller's research and prices will adjust to reflect the new infor-
mation. By setting a low disclosure threshold, short sellers may
not be able to gain substantial profits in order to recoup the
considerable costs of their activities, including the costs of
amassing their stake and conducting research. Furthermore,
the "super locate" requirement will unnecessarily hamper li-
quidity without any accompanying benefits since settlement
failures are adequately addressed by the mandatory buy-in pro-
cedures.13 2 Finally, as illustrated above, 3 3 bans on short selling
or CDS are a misconceived response to a nonexistent problem.
C. An Old Idea: The Financial Transactions Tax
Most famously advocated by James Tobin, a Nobel Prize
Laureate in economics, the financial transaction tax rests on a
simple rationale: to "throw some sand in the wheels" of mar-
kets.' 34 Increasing transaction costs will reduce much of mod-
ern pure speculative trading activity and will lower market vol-
atility while simultaneously raising tax revenue. 35 In the after-
math of the two crises, the idea of a financial transactions tax
has been increasingly gaining traction on both sides of the At-
lantic with negative implications for a wide array of market
participants, including hedge funds whose ability to quickly
exit and enter positions and markets will be severely curtailed.
The E.U. was the first to move, with the European Commission
adopting a first proposal for a Directive implementing an E.U.-
wide financial tax.'3 6 Following objections from several Mem-
sellers suffered a short-squeeze after Porsche announced a majority stake in
Volkswagen).
132. See Rodolphe B. Elineau, Regulating Short Selling in Europe After
the Crisis 16 (May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.
com/rodolphe-elineau/1/.
133. See supra Part II.B and notes 61 & 79.
134. James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J.
153, 154, 158 (1978). See also Payne, supra note 109, at 436.
135. Commission Proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 12, art.
2.
136. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Finan-
cial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM (2011) 594 final
(Sept. 28, 2011).
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ber States 37 who decided not to participate in the adoption of
the Directive implementing a tax on financial transactions,
eleven Member States have decided to move forward alone by
proposing a Directive. 3 8 A revised draft Directive was pub-
lished on February 14, 2013 and is expected to come into
force by January 2014 if all eleven Member States agree.
Pursuant to the draft Directive, the tax is applicable to a
financial transaction where one party is a financial institution
established in one of the eleven participating Member
States.' 3 The scope of application of the tax is broad, covering
a wide array of financial institutions, including among others,
banks, hedge funds, and private equity funds acting for their
own account or on account of their customers.140 The tax cap-
tures the purchase and sale of a financial instrument whether
on an exchange or over-the-counter, intra-group transactions
transferring the risk in a financial instrument, repurchase
agreements, stock lending arrangements, and the conclusion
of derivatives contracts. A financial institution will be con-
sidered to be established in a participating Member State if it
is authorized by financial regulators of that Member State and
has its registered seat or usual residence in that Member
State.' 42 Additionally, a financial institution will be deemed to
be established in a participating Member State if one of the
parties to the transaction, natural or legal person, financial or
non-financial institution, is established in a participating Mem-
ber State.' 4 3 The same applies if the financial instrument
traded was issued within the territory of a participating Mem-
137. Most notably, the U.K. and Luxembourg, two major European finan-
cial centers, have resisted the imposition of a financial tax fearing the ad-
verse effects on the competitiveness of their national financial sector. SeeVa-
nessa Mock & Gabrielle Steinhauser, Eleven European Countries Support Tax on
Transactions, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390443982904578046532220799200.html.
138. Commission Proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 12.
139. Id. art. 3(1), at 23.
140. Id. art. 2(1)(8), at 20-21.
141. Id. art. 2(1)(2), at 20.
142. Id. art. 4(1)(a), (c), (d), at 24.
143. Id. art. 4(1) (f), at 24. As a result, a financial institution established in
a non-participating Member State can become subject to the tax if its
counterparty or the customer on behalf of which it is trading is established
in a participating Member State.
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ber State.144 The tax imposed is left for the individual Member
States to decide but cannot be less than 0.1% of the notional
amount for derivative contracts and 0.1% of the consideration
or market value for other financial transactions.14 5 The rele-
vant financial institution established in a participating Mem-
ber State pays the tax and both parties to a transaction will be
jointly and severally liable for the tax.146
The rationales underpinning the E.U.'s financial transac-
tion tax, namely the raising of revenue from the financial sec-
tor and the creation of disincentives for short-term speculative
trading, especially high-frequency trading, indicate that the
tax is just another child of the response to the financial and
sovereign debt crises. A financial transaction tax will reduce
liquidity in the market, make trading more expensive for inves-
tors, especially small ones, as financial institutions will pass the
costs of the tax onto their customers. Moreover, it will lead to
the relocation of financial activities and financial institutions
offshore. 147 Indeed, a study by Anna Pomeranets and Daniel
Weaver concerning the impact of the financial transaction tax
that New York State imposed on transactions from 1932 until
1981 found that it resulted in a decrease in trading volume, an
increase in the cost of capital, and most importantly increased
volatility.148
144. Id. art. 4(2) (c), at 24-25. The so-called "issuance principle" captures
transactions even if none of the counterparties or their customers are estab-
lished in the participating Member States.
145. Id. art. 9, at 26.
146. Id. art. 10, at 26-27.
147. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A SECURITIEs TRANSAC-
TION TAX: BRIEF ANALYTIC OVERVIEW WITH REVENUE ESTIMATES, (2012); Anna
Pomeranets, Financial Transaction Taxes: International Experiences, Issues and
Feasibility, BANK OF CAN. REV. (Autumn 2012). Mark Keightley offers an ex-
ample illustrating the potential costs that a tax may impose on small inves-
tors, especially non-financial ones. According to Keightley, an airline
purchasing jet fuel futures contracts in January to protect against the risk of
rising summer fuel prices from a counterparty, which speculates that the
prices will move in the other director, may face increased transaction costs as
the counterparty subject to the tax on financial transactions may raise its
price to transact with the airline.
148. See Anna Pomeranets & Daniel G. Weaver, Securities Transaction Taxes
and Market Quality 18 (Bank of Can., Working Paper No. 2011-26), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1980185 (finding
that a financial transaction tax reduces the number of positive net present
value projects).
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Taking into account the abovementioned costs, the Euro-
pean Union has less drastic means at its disposal to achieve its
stated objectives. Forcing banks to cover the costs of the finan-
cial crisis and the implicit guarantees that they enjoy could be
achieved by an imposition of a simple bank levy chargeable
solely to banks or other financial institutions.'4 9 With respect
to high-frequency traders, the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010
when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average suddenly lost about
9% only to recoup its losses a few minutes later and the implo-
sion of Knight Capital, which suffered $440 billion losses due
to computer trading errors, have revealed the destabilizing ef-
fect of high-frequency traders on markets. 5 0 Trading on a
rapid basis using complex computer systems and algorithms in
order to exploit short-term price inefficiencies without any re-
gard to the fundamentals of the companies being traded, high
frequency traders have come to dominate modern financial
markets.1 5' The potential costs of this activity seem to far out-
weigh its benefits, namely the provision of liquidity in mar-
kets.152 Indeed, the latest study on short-termism in U.K eq-
uity markets commissioned by the U.K government revealed
the skepticism of institutional investors towards high fre-
149. SeeJohn Vella et al., The EU Commission's Proposal for a Financial Trans-
action Tax, 2011 BRIT. TAX REV. 607, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2026158.
150. The Flash-Crash has been attributed to the sudden selling of futures
contracts by a mutual fund firm, sparking a massive sell-off led by high fre-
quency traders. See U.S. COMMoorry FUTURES TRADING COMM'N & U.S. SEC. &
EXcH. COMM'N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010:
REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON EMERGING REGUIATORY ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf; Jacob Bunge & Jenny
Strasburg, Loss Swamps Trading Firm, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577564772083
961412.html.
151. In contrast to popular beliefs, the majority of high frequency trading
volume comes from dedicated high frequency trading firms and investment
banks, with a small percentage of six percent coming from hedge funds.
Stuart Baden Powell, High Frequency Trading, HEDGE FUNDJ. (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/node/6402.
152. Although, high frequency traders are praised for providing liquidity
in markets, one should note that the liquidity provided can evaporate
quickly during market stress. Furthermore, the majority of orders submitted
by such traders are rapidly cancelled. SeeSeth Merrin, Economist Debates: High-
Frequency Trading, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.economist.
com/debate/days/view/816.
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quency trading and its perceived benefits.' 5 3 As a result, put-
ting some sand in the wheels of high frequency traders is war-
ranted. The safeguards that have already been proposed in the
context of the revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive, including increased regulation and organizational
requirements for high frequency trading firms, are sufficient
to deal with their potential destabilizing effects. 15 4
V. I
Clusis-DRIVEN REGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUNDS
Roberta Romano contends that significant financial regu-
lations are adopted in response to major financial crises when
an informed understanding of the roots of the crisis has not
yet been reached.'15 5 This pattern of crisis-driven regulation
can even be traced back to the nineteenth century.' 56 Popular
outrage against speculators increases during a crisis as the gen-
153. JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF U.K. EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM
DECISION MAKING: FINAL REPORT 38 (2012).
154. The proposed revision to the Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive would, among others, bring algorithmic traders under direct regulation
by mandating the implementation of resilient risk systems and controls and
the disclosure of the algorithmic trading strategies used. See Commission Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in
Financial Instruments Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council, art. 17, at 69-70, COM (2011) 656 final (Sept. 20, 2011).
Furthermore, the European Parliament has voted to approve amendments
to the Commission's proposal that would require all orders placed by high
frequency traders to remain open for at least 500 milliseconds until they are
cancelled or modified. See Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments
Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, EUR. PARL. Doc. A7-0306/2012, at 103 (Oct. 5, 2012) (proposing
insertion of article 51(1) (b)). See Amendments by the European Parliament
to the Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments repealing Directive
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 51(1) (b),
COD (2011/0298).
155. Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark 4 (Yale Law Sch. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 442, 2012), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1974148.
156. See STUART BANNER, ANGLo-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGuLATION: CUL-
TURAL AND POLITICAL RooTs, 1690-1860, at 1, 3 (1998) (examining securities
regulation in the US and the UK during the period 1690-1860).
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eral public suffers financial losses.15 7 Thus, shifts in public
opinion accompanied by media calls for government interven-
tion and an increase in the political salience of financial mar-
ket regulation result in a regulatory response.' 58 Legislators
seeking reelection and the votes of their constituents will want
to be seen as "doing something" in response to the crisis and
will therefore obey the demands for more regulation.' 59 Un-
fortunately, regulatory response in the midst or in the after-
math of financial crises is bound to be misguided since it is
impossible to form an understanding of the roots of the crisis
in such a short time frame. 6 0
The AIFM Directive, the Short-Selling Regulation, as well
as the Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax, fit perfectly
within the abovementioned pattern. They were all adopted in
response to the 2007 financial crisis and the ongoing sovereign
debt crisis, which had provoked a backlash against hedge
funds, which were criticized as speculators destabilizing the fi-
nancial system and sovereign debt markets. European Union
legislators rapidly adopted regulations targeting hedge fund
speculators and their investment techniques, responding to
the public demand for action in the face of the devastating
crises that led to widespread market declines and economic
contraction. However, the premises on which the E.U.'s regu-
latory response was built were unfounded. In contrast to popu-
lar perceptions, hedge funds played no role either in the 2008
financial crisis or in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis.' 6 ' On
the one hand, the demise of financial institutions should not
be attributed to short sellers, but to failures in their govern-
ance model, including the perverse incentives created by the
structure of executive pay and regulatory capture.'6 2 On the
157. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 849, 851 (1997) (detailing attitudes towards spec-
ulators).
158. Romano, supra note 155, at 5.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra Part II.B.
162. For an in-depth analysis of the causes of the financial crisis and the
demise of banking institutions, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AN) ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-
reports/fcicjfinal-reportjful.pdf.
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other hand, the European sovereign debt crisis is the result of
the Eurozone's institutional weaknesses and individual coun-
tries' profligate behavior. 63
The misguided European regulatory response to the twin
crises will negatively affect hedge funds, potentially leading to
their withdrawal from European markets. While it seems at
first glance that only the AIFM Directive and its onerous and
costly organizational requirements will directly impact the
hedge fund industry, the effect of the Short Selling Regulation
and the Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax, by cur-
tailing their investment techniques and market operations will
be equally devastating for hedge funds. Short selling is one of
the most widely used investment techniques of hedge funds
seeking to generate profits.164 The Short Selling Regulation
and particularly the low disclosure requirements will chill
short selling activity by hedge funds, thus lowering their re-
turns. 65 Additionally, the short selling bans will have adverse
consequences during market stress, leading panicked investors
to massively withdraw their funds from hedge funds as wit-
nessed in the 2007 financial crisis.' 66 Furthermore, the finan-
163. Greece for instance allowed the rise of an inefficient public sector
exploited by various rent-seeking groups such as trade unions and business
magnates while in Ireland, the government was forced to backstop with tax-
payer funds an overleveraged banking system on the brink of collapse. See
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN THE NEW THIRD WORLD (2012). De-
spite the apparent success of the common currency, the euro, it suffers from
profound institutional weakness, most notably weak labor mobility, a lack of
fiscal transfer mechanisms and the lack of individualized monetary policy for
countries that have joined the monetary union. See Martin Feldstein, Optimal
Currency Areas, Speech at the ECB Fifth Central Bank Conference: Optimal
Currency Areas (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/feldstein/
Optimal%20Currency%2OAreas.pdf. Moreover, the option of currency de-
valuation is not available for a country sharing the common currency. As a
result, the boosting of exports and the decrease in imports has to be accom-
plished by the method of internal devaluation, namely the lowering of labor
costs primarily through nominal wage reductions. See Int'L MONETARY FUND,
GREECE: REQUEST FOR EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND
FACILITY - STAFF REPORT; STAFF SUPPLEMENT; PRESS RELEASE ON THE EXECU-
TIVE BOARD DISCUSSION; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
GREECE, 13 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2012/cr1257.pdf.
164. See LHABITANT, supra note 17, at 127
165. See WmAN, supra note 130, at 5.
166. HEDGE FUND STANDARDS BD., THE ROLE OF SHORT SELLING IN MAR-
KETS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SHORT SELLING BAN: RESPONSE TO THE CESR
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cial transactions tax, if implemented, will suppress one of the
main competitive advantages of hedge funds, namely their
ability to rapidly enter and exit positions in different markets
and countries. Raising transaction costs will result in a diminu-
tion of hedge fund trading. As a result, hedge funds will be
restrained from generating returns by exploiting short-term
price inefficiencies and from fulfilling their roles as liquidity
providers and arbitrageurs correcting mispricing in financial
markets and thereby contributing to market efficiency.
VI.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to shed light on E.U. legislation
impacting hedge funds and reveal its rather defective founda-
tions. The adoption of the AIFM Directive, the Short Selling
Regulation, and the Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax
were based more on perceptions than actual evidence, a prom-
inent characteristic of crisis-driven regulation. In regulating
hedge funds, the European Union has moved forward with
regulating not only hedge funds and their managers, but also
their investment techniques and market operations. The cu-
mulative impact of the E.U.'s crisis-driven regulatory spree will
be a severe increase in costs for hedge funds operating in Eu-
rope and a decline in investor returns with negative conse-
quences for European investors and markets.
CALL FOR EVIDENCE ON REGULATION ON SHORT SELLING 8 (2009), available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/HFSBCESRShort-Selling-sub
mission.pdf; Louise Armitstead, Hedge Funds Plan to Sue ISA over Short-Selling
Ban, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London) (Sept. 21, 2008), at 3, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/3046948/Hedge-funds-plan-to-sue-FSA-over-
short-selling-ban.html.
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and Texas - have opened the doors to the opportunity to recognize foreign
money judgments despite the absence of the judgment debtor's assets in the
recognizing forum. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the famous footnote 36 of
the Shaffer case, had already dispensed the enforcing courts with the need to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. The case law devel-
oped by the New York and Texas courts, however, goes further than the
Shaffer decision, considering superfluous any kind ofjurisdictional require-
ment in the post-judgment phase. This comment analyzes the main legal
and economic reasons that justify the recognition of foreign money judg-
ments despite the lack of assets. Special consideration has been given to the
due process objection that has been raised against the new trend inaugu-
rated by the Lenchyshyn decision. This comment aims at demonstrating that
there is no due process obstacle arising out of the Shaffer footnote 36, and
that granting recognition to foreign decisions despite the lack of assets in the
recognizing forum would strongly facilitate recovery from judgment debtors
who do not voluntarily comply with their obligations.
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